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Arising from widespread outsourcing and, in particular, offshoring, goods and services are 
increasingly provided by supply networks that rely on global logistic systems. While the risks and 
uncertainties involved in this strategy have been widely acknowledged in the literature on inter-
organizational networks and supply chain management, labor conditions and labor relations – and 
related human resource management issues – have thus far been neglected. Starting from a perspective 
that takes into consideration that global supply networks are not only confronted with calculable risks 
but also genuine uncertainties, we explore the conditions under which labor may constitute a source as 
well as a means for dealing with risk and uncertainty. The study is based on a review of the relevant 
inter-organizational network and supply chain management literature and is informed by an 
investigation of International Framework Agreements (IFAs) in ten European corporations and their 
supply networks. IFAs – in addition to unilateral codes of conduct – could be used to detect and cope 
with labor-related risk and uncertainties. However, our findings reveal that this is not the case. This 
leads to some tentative theoretical conclusions and implications for dealing with risk and uncertainty 
in global supply networks. 
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There was no need to wait for the financial crisis or the problems that Foxconn/Apple and 
Toyota faced in China in 2010 and the protests following the burning of apparel factories in 
Bangladesh in 2012 to acknowledge the vulnerability of global production and supply 
networks. A much earlier and often reported event in this respect was a strike at a company 
supplying brakes to General Motors (GM) that idled workers at 26 of that company’s 
assembly plants for 18 days in 1996 and caused a reduction of US $ 900 million in quarterly 
earnings; and this although GM already then opted for a dual sourcing strategy that allowed 
some buffering in supply chains for catastrophic supply disruption (Meena et al. 2011).  
The abundant literature on risk and uncertainty in supply chains (e.g., Waters 2007) or, more 
generally, inter-organizational networks (e.g., Beckman et al. 2004) has contributed 
significantly to our understanding of this problem. For example, some studies have tried to 
clarify how risk and uncertainty are perceived, interpreted and eventually managed and what 
this may imply for a focal firm’s operating performance and shareholder value (cf. Zsidisin 
and Wagner 2010). At the same time, sub-disciplines like “supply chain risk management” 
(e.g., Paulsson 2004), more recently extended to “global supply chain risk management” (e.g., 
Manuj and Mentzer 2008a, b) have developed, focusing for understandable reasons more on 
calculable risks than on fundamental uncertainty. This is also true for the first handbooks that 
helped to assess and manage supply chain risks (e.g., Zsidisin and Ritchie 2008). 
Nevertheless, this research provides not only important insights into potential sources of risk 
and uncertainty but also some useful distinctions such as demand versus supply side risks, 
operational versus catastrophic risks, and between cause- and effect-oriented approaches to 
risk management (Wagner and Bode 2008).  
A noteworthy feature of this literature is that it largely neglects the role of labor as a potential 
source of risk and uncertainty or as a potential means to cope with them. This is surprising 
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given that labor conditions and labor relations, at least for the more relational forms of global 
production and supply networks (Golicic and Mentzer 2005; Rinehart et al. 2004; Nyaga and 
Whipple 2011), are essential for smooth functioning of inter-organizational systems where 
risk and uncertainty surrounding labor issues can neither be eliminated nor managed by 
simply switching suppliers of goods or services in a market-like fashion. The neglect of labor 
in the research on supply chain risks management (SCRM) or uncertainty in networked 
constellations of organizations is particularly surprising because the availability of cheap 
and/or qualified labor is an important driver of investment/divestment and 
outsourcing/offshoring decisions (e.g. Cooke 2001; Lewin et al., 2006). Consequently, the 
organization of production in global supply chains or networks makes such practices an 
important (additional) source of risk and uncertainty and a relevant ‘object’ for monitoring 
and control.  
In this paper we aim to explore the dual role of labor as a source of risk and uncertainty and as 
problems means of coping with associated in global supply chains/networks. As a first step, 
we define global supply chains or networks as inter-organizational arrangements of 
contractors and subcontractors that span several continents whose products and services 
contribute to the final product or service of a focal firm. Starting from a perspective that 
strictly differentiates between risk and uncertainty (Knight 1921), also with regard to such 
arrangements, we argue for a view that regards these as endpoints of a continuum. We then 
explore the conditions under which labor may constitute a major source of supply risk or 
uncertainty and inquire into the extent to which labor and labor-related issues feature as major 
supply problems for transnational corporations’ (TNCs). More precisely, our guiding research 
question comprises two elements: First, under what conditions is labor considered a source of 




Since this is a first attempt that we are aware of to address the issue of labor-related risks and 
uncertainties in global supply, it is not possible to build on prior theoretical or empirical 
research. Nevertheless, by referring to a unique data set on the conclusion and implementation 
of International Framework Agreements (IFAs), we are able to explore some practices that 
may have been developed by management, perhaps with unions and other organizations, to 
detect and cope with labor-related risk and uncertainty problems. Such agreements are 
negotiated and signed by TNCs and global union federations’ (GUFs) in order to afford 
mutual recognition and to secure minimum labor standards (cf. Hammer 2005; Fichter et al. 
2011). Involving management and labor, these bilateral agreements are potentially more 
effective than unilateral codes of conduct because they are based on a collaborative, problem-
solving approach that may be uniquely placed to manage risk and uncertainty across global 
supply chains. Our investigation of IFAs, especially TNC managements’ and GUFs’ motives 
in concluding such agreements, indicates their potential to control, or at least mitigate risks 
associated with quality and on-time delivery of inputs into final goods and services. These 
agreements could potentially represent an approach to deal with labor-related related risk and 
uncertainty, especially when the tool is embedded in a bundle of suitable human resource 
management (HRM) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices comprising a 
commitment HRM system. However, thus far labor-related SCRM has ignored the potential 
of this instrument. We discuss possible reasons for this and conclude with implications for 
management practice and research. Towards this end we formulate three propositions. The 
first addresses the potential of IFAs to deal with labor-related risk and uncertainty in global 
supply networks, while the second concerns the present over-reliance on market rather than 
relational control, exchanging labor-related risks for additional selection uncertainty. The 
third proposition claims a general lack of reflexivity regarding these issues, on the part of 
management and labor. But before proceeding we take a closer look at risk and uncertainty in 
global supply networks. 
5 
 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY NETWORKS 
Stimulated by the 9/11 catastrophe, risk and uncertainty have received considerable attention 
in the two academic discourses relevant to our research question. The management literature 
on inter-organizational networks focuses in more or less abstract categories on risk and 
uncertainty in such inter-organizational arrangements (e.g., Beckman et al. 2004; Gereffi et al. 
2005; Sydow et al. 2013); while under the label of SCRM supply chain operations analysts 
(e.g., Brindley 2004; Waters 2007; Narasimhan and Talluri 2009) adopt a more managerial 
and increasingly global perspective to address practical problems. This growing interest in 
both streams of research mirrors the development of complex webs of supply arrangements – 
where competitor firms may sometimes use the same suppliers and indeed the same parts – 
leading to competitive and collaborative overlapping inter-dependencies among firms in the 
network.  
However, as shown below, much of this research fails to address genuine uncertainty in these 
arrangements and is silent on the sources of these uncertainties, especially regarding labor 
both as a source of risk or uncertainty and as a remedial ‘instrument’. This also applies to the 
literature on inter-organizational networks (Sydow et al., 2013). Before summarizing the 
insights from these two streams of research, we elaborate further on the meaning of global 
supply networks and demonstrate the neglect of labor conditions and labor relations in this 
literature.  
Global Supply Networks and the Neglect of Labor  
The notion of networks is widely used in the management literature and increasingly also in 
research on supply chains and logistics management. It represents an analytical perspective or 
is conceptualized as a governance structure of economic activities (Grabher and Powell 2004). 
In the latter case, a network is typically viewed as a social system in which the activities of at 
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least three formally independent organizations, such as contractors and subcontractors, are 
coordinated repeatedly in time-space. In other words, there is a reflexively agreed-upon inter-
organizational division of labor and cooperation among the organizations that comprise the 
network (Sydow and Windeler 1998; Provan and Kenis 2008). More often than not this is 
under the guidance of a lead firm like Apple or H&M (e.g. Jarillo 1988; Müller-Seitz 2012). 
Usually network organizations are connected to one another, or at least to the lead firm, with 
the help of bi- or multilateral contracts and informal contacts (Berends et al. 2011). Thus, 
from a governance perspective, global supply networks comprise organizations from different 
countries that seek economic advantage from the international division of labor (in particular 
by means of offshoring) and, because of cultural and/or institutional differences, require 
additional coordination efforts (e.g., Ernst and Kim 2002; Henderson et al. 2002; Bair 2008).  
Research on global supply networks rarely refers to labor issues. This is not only true for the 
discourse on SC(R)M that at least from time to time mentions labor and labor-related issues as 
“drivers” of risk or uncertainty (e.g., Jüttner 2005 and below) but also for research on inter-
organizational networks more generally (see Borgatti and Foster 2003 or Provan et al. 2007 
for recent reviews). This is surprising because labor conditions and labor relations including 
pay, training and opportunities for participation in decision-making, are strongly affected by 
this organizational form where negative feedback may endanger its functioning (see, 
Marchington et al. 2005 and Flecker and Meil 2010). The related discourse on “global 
production networks” (mainly among economic geographers, sociologists and political 
scientists) at least pays some attention to labor, though mainly either as victims of 
globalization or as sources of value creation and/or resistance (e.g., Frenkel 2001; Coe et al. 
2008; Bair 2008; Levy 2008; Rainnie et al. 2011; Selwyn 2012; Coe and Hess 2013). .  
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Risk and Uncertainty in Inter-organizational Networks and Supply Chain Management 
Unlike the subject of labor, both research streams mentioned above take risk and uncertainty 
seriously although they do not distinguish between these concepts. This is a weakness 
because, as we explain below, risk and uncertainty may require different management 
approaches. Uncertainty is the inability of an (individual or collective) actor to predict or 
anticipate the future. Following Knight (1921), uncertainty is unfathomable and unpredictable 
and is therefore not insurable (cf. Froud 2003: 572). In the extreme, dealing with uncertainty 
includes managing the unexpected (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). By contrast, risk is concerned 
with the expected (the “known unknown”) and often associated with potential losses. Risk, in 
stark contrast to uncertainty – the “unknown unknown” – is assumed to be calculable in terms 
of probabilities and as such is often incorporated into cost benefit or net present value 
calculations. In this respect, some, but not all uncertainty, can effectively become “organized” 
(Power 2007) and thereby translated by management into ‘risks’. As such, it is assumed, 
rightly or wrongly, to be manageable. Rather than viewing risk and uncertainty as distinct 
concepts, each can be regarded as endpoints on a continuum of calculability, especially 
because the literatures on interorganizational networks and SCRM treat the notion of risk in a 
broader sense to include some uncertainty (see below and, more generally, Renn 2008). 
There is considerable research on risk and uncertainty in inter-organizational networks (Das 
and Teng 1996, 2001; Beckman et al. 2004; Huxham and Vangen 2000; cf. Sydow et al. 2013 
for a recent review). Useful distinctions introduced by this literature include those between 
(external) general market uncertainty and (intra-network) partner uncertainty (Mitsuhashi 
(2002) and between the broadening or deepening of existing network relations in order to deal 
with uncertainty (Beckman et al. 2004). In a related vein, alliance research (a section of inter-
organizational analysis) distinguishes between performance and relational risks (Das and 
Teng 1996, 2001). From a managerial perspective on alliances/networks Mitsuhashi (2002) 
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investigated what he called ‘selection uncertainty’ – defined “as ambiguity prior to alliance 
formation about which partner will serve a firm’s interests best” (p. 114) and concerning three 
sources of uncertainty: (1) technological competence of the prospective partners, (2) their 
expected behavior and (3) potential commercial success of the new arrangements. While other 
authors have also studied the role of risk and uncertainty for partner selection (e.g., Podolny 
1994; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) and even the general uncertainties surrounding network 
membership (Huxham and Vangen 2000), the conceptual distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is rarely made, and as in Mitsuhashi’s study, labor as a source of risk or 
uncertainty goes unmentioned. 
A similar point can be made regarding research on supply chain (risk) management (SCRM) 
(e.g., Brindley 2004; Peck 2005, 2007; Waters 2007; Ritchie and Brindley 2007; Zsidisin and 
Ritchie 2008; Narasimhan and Talluri 2009). Starting with Harland (1996), this more applied 
research stream has moved from a linear, static and dyadic understanding of supply chains to 
a more complex and dynamic conception of supply networks. At about the same time, 
research on SC(R)M overcame its rather narrow focus on modeling and simulating calculable 
risks (which more or less paralleled statistical process control) and instead incorporated some 
uncertainty into its analyses (see Paulsson 2004 as well as Manuj and Mentzer 2008a for 
recent reviews). Nevertheless, the assumption that uncertainty can be “organized” and 
translated into risks (e.g. with the help of probability estimates based upon simulations) 
remains central to the SCRM practice (e.g., Paulsson 2004; Jüttner 2005; Kleindorfer and 
Saad 2005; Trkman and McCormack 2009). However, real uncertainty (at the end of the 
calculability continuum) remains leaving individual and organizational actors in supply chains 
vulnerable to significant losses. 
SCRM usefully distinguishes between a cause-oriented practice aiming at risk avoidance and 
an effect-oriented practice aimed at mitigating the effects of supply chain disruption (Wagner 
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and Bode 2008). Surprisingly, labor is again hardly mentioned in the SCRM literature as a 
source of risk or uncertainty. Only from time to time does this literature refer to examples like 
disruptions following strikes or accidents, work-to-rule campaigns, high turnover and 
absenteeism, or lack of skill, motivation and/or commitment (with resulting supply shortages, 
quality problems or low productivity) either in supplier firms or logistics providers or in the 
process of inter-organizational collaboration (e.g., Peck 2005; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Sheffi 
and Rice 2005; Sawhney 2006; Waters 2007: 13-14; Ryu et al. 2009). A major reason for 
neglecting this potential source of risk and uncertainty may be a concentration by supply 
chain researchers on demand rather than supply or process risks/uncertainties (cf. Peidro et al. 
2009). A second reason is the – often implicit, little relational – assumption that most labor 
issues can be relatively easily addressed by either close monitoring and rectification 
strategies, or ultimately by terminating and renegotiating supplier contracts, and if necessary, 
switching suppliers. 
A rare exception is Jiang et al. (2009) who highlight the severe adverse consequences to 
global supply networks of job dissatisfaction and turnover among Chinese migrant workers. 
Productivity, product quality, supply delays and shortages constitute operational risks, 
particularly in a just-in-time environment while reputational risks arise when firms receive 
media attention for alleged violation of labor standards. For reasons advanced below, there is 
need for more SCRM research on labor as a source of risk and/or uncertainty in global supply 
networks.  
LABOR AS A SOURCE OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN  
GLOBAL SUPPLY NETWORKS 
In a fundamental way labor has been and continues to be a major source of risk and 
uncertainty in the production or value creation process (March and Simon 1958; Braverman 
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1974; Crozier and Friedberg 1980). This is so for four main reasons. First, because product 
markets are usually competitive, extant employment, pay and conditions cannot be 
guaranteed. Failure to maintain, let alone improve employment contracts will be challenged 
by workers on grounds of contractual violation. In response, workers may withdraw effort, 
challenge management authority or quit. These responses will adversely affect firm 
performance. A second reason concerns distributive justice: the distribution of net revenues is 
a matter of continual contestation between employees and management. Third, management’s 
treatment of workers in terms of procedures and/or social relationships may be perceived 
negatively giving rise to grievances concerning procedural and interactional justice. A fourth 
reason, which may lead to uncertainty rather than risk, is a change in the external environment 
such as a major technological change (e.g. from hot letterpress printing to cold computer 
production), the sudden unavailability of critical raw materials (e.g. rare earths), or political 
change (e.g. the collapse of communism in East Germany in 1989 and the Arab Spring of 
2012). The chief means of mitigating risk arising from labor is through sophisticated HRM 
systems that may assume forms ranging from relatively coercive high compliance to high 
commitment systems (see Khatri et al. 2006). Employer groups also lobby governments for 
favorable policy outcomes intended to provide a more predictable political-economic 
environment.  
Labor, Risk, Uncertainty and Governance 
Because inter-organizational global networks typically comprise firms in different sub-sectors 
across different countries labor-related risk and uncertainty are magnified and at the same 
time not subject to control by senior management fiat. On the other hand, HR systems at the 
firm level are complemented by ‘network control’ based on relatively stable and cooperative 
inter-organizational relationships that provide normative and ultimately coercive pressure on 
firms to meet their contractual obligations. This provides firms in the network with a strong 
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incentive to ensure stable labor relations. Although an individual firm may fail to meet market 
tests (Farmer, 1989) and so be threatened with elimination from the network, overall 
collaboration continues through support from the lead firm (Frenkel and Scott, 2002) or 
reselection of suppliers based on past experience (see Sako and Helper 1998; Rinehardt et al. 
2004). This “relationship magnitude” (Golicic and Mentzer 2005) on a strategic level is 
sometimes complemented on an operational level by “interorganizational citizenship 
behavior” (Autry et al. 2008), where extra efforts are made by boundary spanning employees 
of one firm in support of another. Such contributions maintain organizational ties, improve 
individual firm performance and promote the effective functioning of the network. However, 
they cannot be relied upon to guarantee orderly, cooperative labor relations in all firms 
throughout the network.  
Finally, two points are worth noting regarding labor and its implications for analyzing risk 
and uncertainty across global supply networks. First, there is the distinction between direct 
and indirect labor action. And second, there is the possibility of that position on the 
continuum of risk and uncertainty changes over time according to contextual changes. 
Regarding the first point, it is useful to distinguish between the possibility of disruption to 
product supply and/or quality arising from direct labor relations, i.e. relations between 
management and employees within firms, and disruption arising from indirect labor relations. 
This refers to the role played by workers’ formal organizations e.g. trade unions or informal 
workplace groups. These organizations may develop strategies to mobilize their constituents. 
Such strategies may either serve to create greater risk (e.g. via strikes) or less risk (e.g. 
through collective agreements). Regarding the second point, labor in particular countries that 
provide inputs to a product or service may by relatively strike-free, making it possible to 
estimate risk of production losses arising from this source across the network. However, if 
links between unions develop across nations via global unions or GUFs and this leads to 
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demands and strike threats, or if transnational NGOs campaign in some of the source 
countries and industries for improved labor standards the probability of operational losses and 
reputational damage becomes much more difficult to estimate.  
One way to reduce this tendency towards uncertainty is to develop an International 
Framework Agreement (IFA) with the GUF representing various relevant national unions. 
Such an agreement provides a basis for negotiating changes to employment contracts and 
limiting strikes across the network. Alternatively, in the case of an NGO campaign, firms in 
the network may invite examination and certification by an international NGO specializing in 
labor standard evaluation.1 Ultimately it is the relationship between management and labor 
within the network firms that determines the level of risk or uncertainty. That this is 
conditioned by national legislation and political-economic conditions is widely recognized 
when speaking about “country risks”, although as we have already noted, political change can 
be comprise a fundamental uncertainty. Thus, with regard to the countries included in our 
study of IFAs (see below), service providers like Business Monitor International have usually 
deemed Turkey and the United States to be much higher risk than Brazil and India. 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS AS AN INSTRUMENT 
FOR DEALING WITH RISK AND UNCERTAINTY  
IN GLOBAL SUPPLY NETWORKS? 
By the end of 2012 85 TNCs had signed an IFA with a GUF. Although there are now 
corporations on all continents that have concluded an agreement, by far most of them are 
headquartered in Europe. As a joint statement of commitment, an IFA is intended to secure 
and transfer organizational practices which ensure compliance with basic labor standards, in 
                                                            
1 In response to the publicity of its labor-related problems with Foxconn, Apple joint the Fair Labor Association which offers 
corporations, including lead firms of global supply networks, independent audits of labor conditions at supplier sites (Fair 
Labor Association 2012). 
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particular with the core labour standards established by the ILO's (1998) Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.2 Towards this end, most IFAs do not only cite 
these standards but also contain a formal conflict resolution mechanism; however, only few 
include terms and conditions that exceed minimum labor standards. Importantly, and very 
much in contrast to unilateral CSR strategies, no matter whether they are based on comparable 
standards like the Global Compact or ISO 26000 or whether or not they are considered as 
formal (legally enforceable) contracts or non-legally binding agreements by both parties, 
these are binding outcomes of bilateral negotiations. Are these agreements, like some CSR 
instruments (e.g., Frenkel 2001; Waddock 2008) tools for coping with risk or even uncertainty 
in global production networks?  
Data Collection and Analysis  
Our analysis of the motives behind and, to some extent, implementation of IFAs draws on 
both primary and secondary sources. A sample of 73 agreements (out of the now 85) together 
with interviews with management and union representatives enabled us to address the above-
mentioned questions. In a comprehensive content analysis of these agreements we identified 
125 substantive and procedural IFA characteristics which were divided into four general 
categories: actors identified by signatures; substance distinguished by ILO standards and 
itemized topics; procedures defined by monitoring bodies and implementation measures; and 
scope which referred to the participating subsidiaries and suppliers. Value statements in the 
agreement preambles were also reviewed. 
Between November 2008 and March 2011 we conducted semi-structured interviews with key 
actors from TNCs (HR management, works councils) and from unions (GUFs, home-country 
trade unions) at the HQ level, i.e. with actors directly involved in initiating and negotiating an 
                                                            
2 The core labor standards refer to the prohibition of child labor (ILO co. 138 and 182) and forced labor (ILO co. 29 and 105), 
to non-discrimination and equal pay (ILO co. 100 and 111), and to freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO co. 
87 and 98). 
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IFA. In addition we conducted interviews in our four host countries, again including local 
actors from both sides. The average duration of these interviews, which contained questions 
on the motivation as well as the implementation of IFAs, was 45 minutes. With few 
exceptions, the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Furthermore, we 
completed some two dozen background interviews of similar length with representatives from 
civil society organizations, employer associations, and academic experts on national industrial 
relations systems, all of whom are indirectly engaged in and familiar with IFA-related 
processes. 
In order to better understand whether organizational and institutional environments facilitated 
or deterred implementation of IFAs and especially conflict resolution as formally specified in 
these agreements, we collected and reviewed basic data on TNCs and their operations 
(including CSR reports) and on GUFs. These data included the institutional environments of 
home and host countries. Finally, members of the research team participated in several 
workshops, discussions, and meetings in which union and employee representatives, and 
managers, either engaged in IFA-related activities or reflected on their approach to IFAs. 
Based on 45 and 57 of these interviews in the home and four selected host countries 
respectively (see Table 1 for details), we conducted a comparative study of ten cases with the 
aim of understanding such agreements including difficulties of transferring associated 
practices from headquarters to subsidiaries and, possibly, even suppliers (Fichter et al. 2011). 
The case studies, summarized in Table 1, were sampled from the 85 corporations that had 
signed an IFA by the end of 2012. In order to control for broad institutional effects, we 
focused exclusively on TNCs headquartered in Europe that comprise 85 percent of the firms 
with an IFA. In addition, two further criteria for inclusion were that corporations should have 
signed an agreement with one of the four dominant GUFs: the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation (IMF: 19 agreements); the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
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General Workers’ Unions (ICEM: 13); the Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI: 
15); and Union Network International (UNI: 28); and the corporations should have 
subsidiaries in all four countries mentioned earlier. The rationale for the latter criterion is that 
these are significant economies with either problematic labor conditions (Brazil, India and 
Turkey) and/or contested labor relations regimes (e.g. India and the US). In all ten cases we 
were able to interview management and labor representatives; in almost all cases also in the 
four countries under scrutiny.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In this particular study we were mainly interested in the motivation of TNC management and 
GUF representatives to negotiate and sign an IFA. Semi-structured interviews followed a 
guideline that started with gathering some background data and then turned to motivation and 
implementation issues. No attempt was made to explicitly encourage responses regarding any 
particular motive, including SCRM or dealing with uncertainty with regard to labor and labor 
relations more generally. The reconstruction of the motives (and sequences of events or 
actions in the process) allows insights into the process unattainable by a detailed review of 
IFA documents alone. In particular, interviews with management and labor representatives in 
the ten cases enabled us to capture the possibly different perspectives of the actors involved. 
Multiple sources of information, including earlier studies of IFAs (e.g., Hammer 2005; Davies 
et al. 2011; Papadakis 2011a; Niforou 2012), also allowed data analysis triangulation (Jick 
1979). Moreover, we received valuable feedback on the results of our case study research 
from representatives of management and unions in workshops organized in the four afore-
mentioned countries. 
Complex Motives, Difficult Implementation  
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Two motives dominate unions’ desire to sign IFAs: (1) securing minimum pay and acceptable 
working conditions for employees, in particular union members, and (2) institutionalizing a 
formal conflict resolution process as a means to obtaining union recognition, in particular by 
GUFs. By contrast, the TNCs’ management motives are more complex. These have been 
recently categorized as coercive, anticipative and consequential (reflecting societal pressure) 
(Papadakis 2011b). This three-fold classification of motives proved useful in analyzing our 
interview data: (1) Coercive motives concern regulatory obligations (like the EU directive on 
European Works Councils that in several cases have cosigned IFAs) as well as cultural 
expectations, notably in the home country of the TNC (internal to the company as well as the 
wider industrial relations culture in the country). With regard to the latter, the role of the lead 
firm in a buyer- vs. producer-driven supply chains (cf. Gereffi et al. 2005) seems to matter 
more. In the former case, the pressure to comply appears to be stronger, not least because of 
the danger of losing reputation and brand value. TNCs’ management motive, then, is to 
comply with these demands and, thereby gain, retain or defend organizational legitimacy. For 
instance, several manager interviewees emphasized that they wanted to demonstrate that their 
companies were responsible and attractive employers. (2) Anticipatory motives refer to 
ensuring enterprise stability and profitability and minimizing social risks that may even 
become a source of competitive advantage. The central argument is that in societies where 
corporations are increasingly aware of reputational damage caused by association with goods 
or services produced under exploitative conditions, it makes sense for such firms to develop a 
risk avoidance capability with the added advantage of attracting and retaining highly 
motivated and appropriately qualified employees (Greening and Turban 2000). (3) 
Consequential civil society motives comprise reactive, counter responses by management to 
information and mobilization campaigns by trade unions and NGOs. Examples of the latter 
are the recent UNI organizing campaigns which targeted providers of global cleaning and 
security services.  
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Two cases, OfficeCorp and FurnCorp, both family-owned and from the jurisdiction of the 
BWI, do not seem to fit in either of the three categories. Their signing of an IFA seems rather 
to be motivated by a long corporate tradition of caring for employees; a policy that is, in face 
of globalization, extended to subsidiaries in foreign countries and even suppliers and is 
institutionally supported by putting quality control (rather than HR) in charge of these issues 
within the HQ.  
All the cases of ‘anticipatory motives’ may be oriented toward dealing with uncertainty or to 
practicing SCRM, comprising measures to identify risk sources, estimate potential 
consequences, and reduce or mitigate risk in the supply network. However, we found little 
evidence from the IFAs and interviews that managing risk and uncertainty was a prime 
motive. Only some risk management motivation was evident related to the idea of organizing 
global supply chains/networks with the help of standards (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). In 
these cases, however, more often than not management envisaged something other than labor 
standards (e.g., standards regarding product quality and safety or HRM practices). For 
illustrative purposes we refer to those cases, in which the theme of managing risk and 
uncertainty along the supply chain is addressed more or less explicitly, in some detail:3  
 A senior manager of RubberCorp, a diversified company in the chemical industry, 
referred repeatedly to the IFA signed with ICEM as a “license to operate”. This meant that 
the decentralized way operations and work are organized by this firm around the globe 
requires acceptance by the relevant “communities”, including local and global consumers, 
NGOs, national and global unions and state and supra-state agencies. An IFA legitimizes 
the organization in the eyes of key stakeholder groups and reduces reputational risks. The 
same manager, however, emphasized that the agreement itself does not provide any new 
social or labor standards for this family-owned enterprise with a long history of 
                                                            




CSR/HRM.4 In sharp contrast to this issue of legitimation, the rationale of developing and 
maintaining strong and stable relationships with employees was not mentioned.  
 BuildCorp, a service-focused construction company that acquired similar companies and 
organized its activities in a network around the globe, resembles RubberCorp regarding its 
heterarchical (Hedlund 1986) structure. This firm has signed an IFA and the Global 
Compact arguing in a similar vein to RubberCorp that a proactive CSR policy already 
implies socially responsible monitoring of operations in ‘problematic’ countries. The 
signing of the IFA – initiated, by the way, by the national building workers’ union, not the 
BWI – makes little difference to this risk-oriented approach that is guided by the auditing 
department. In fact, measures to implement the agreement organization-wide (e.g., 
management training, inclusion of sub-contractors, and the creation of a CSR council) 
have only been undertaken quite recently, i.e. eight years after the conclusion of the IFA. 
The most important motives in signing the agreement were the company’s intentions to 
continue co-operative industrial relations relationships at HQ level and to avoid 
reputational damage by keeping alleged violations of labor standards from external (i.e. 
government and mass media) scrutiny. That the agreement is taken seriously by the lead 
firm and the supplier network is illustrated by two examples. One is from the United 
States where collective bargaining rights of workers at a supplier to the local subsidiary 
had been violated. In this case, the contract with the sub-contractor was terminated. A 
similar case was reported in Germany where a supplier illegally employed workers from 
Eastern Europe without paying the obligatory minimum wage. Again, the contract with 
the supplier was terminated. 
 The management of MetalCorp, a leading European car manufacturer, is well aware of the 
fact that labor conditions and labor relations are a potential threat to the smooth operation 
of the supply chain and to the company’s reputation. According to management 
interviewees this problem does not exist at the level of first-tier suppliers but rather at the 
periphery of global supply networks. At the same time, management acknowledges that it 
is not easy to regulate companies that are the most likely sources of labor-related risks and 
uncertainties. The same argument is advanced by a European car manufacturer that signed 
an IFA a few years after MetalCorp. Interestingly, the potential of IFAs as a risk 
management practice is also explicitly acknowledged in a statement by the management 
                                                            
4 The same point is emphasized by the management of a chemical corporation that has not signed an IFA whose management 
argued that pursuing a proactive CSR/HRM policy means there is no need to sign an IFA. 
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of a European bank that refuses to sign an IFA. Management’s argument is that a global 
labor standard does not fit the decentralized corporate approach which permits 
subsidiaries to adapt their labor policies to the specific circumstances of the local 
institutional environment.  
 According to the communication manager of OfficeCorp, risk management considerations 
played a role when the firm signed the IFA. However, this was not a central issue because 
of the firm’s long tradition of positive labor relations which includes employee 
representation on the executive and supervisory boards although not legally required. The 
head of the works council, who initiated the process at OfficeCorp, confirmed this view 
and made no mention of the IFA having any relevance for dealing with labor-related risks 
and uncertainties. 
 The final case is ServiceCorp, one of the world’s largest cleaning and security service 
providers. Management emphasized repeatedly that, consistent with their image of a 
caring global employer, they value a conflict resolution procedure organized by a global 
union. This is intended to avert disruption by resolving disputes with employees. This 
argument recognizes labor process risk mitigation in lieu of switching suppliers which, in 
any case, may not be a viable strategy in this labor-intensive service business. 
In sum, the cases studied (and a few cases without an IFA we looked at for comparison) 
demonstrate that management, in obvious contrast to union representatives, does not see many 
advantages in IFAs as a complement to corporate CSR/HRM policies. At best, IFAs are seen 
by management as an additional tool to guarantee – substantively and/or symbolically – 
global minimum working conditions and, less frequently, a formal means of resolving 
conflict. More importantly in the specific context of this paper, IFAs are not viewed by 
managers or labor representatives as a cause- or an effect-oriented tool for SCRM or for 
limiting operational risk and uncertainty regarding labor-related issues. If IFAs matter at all in 
this regard, their main role seems to be to mitigate reputational risk.  
While the literature on SCRM seems to neglect labor-related risk and uncertainty because of 
its concentration on demand rather than supply or process uncertainties (cf. Peidro et al. 
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2009), the initiation, termination and renegotiation of supplier contracts is in practice often 
left to the purchasing department without any participation of a CSR/HR (or auditing) unit. 
This organizational division of labor is likely to hinder a more wholistic or integrated 
approach to CSR that enables participation of labor relations and HR experts. On the other 
hand, these very experts may lack the competence for evaluating and framing unsatisfactory 
working conditions and contested labor relations in terms of risks and uncertainties as they are 
typically unfamiliar with this frame of reference and accompanying analysis. 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Like unilateral approaches, IFAs concluded between TNCs and GUFs seem first of all to fit 
into the general reputational concerns of management, i.e. legitimating corporate behavior and 
ensuring that expert institutional assessment bodies endorse corporate CSR-related practices 
(cf. Doh et al. 2010). However, these agreements could be regarded by management and labor 
representatives as a cause-oriented practice aimed at avoidance or reduction of risks and 
uncertainties, as well as an effect-oriented practice seeking to mitigating risks and 
uncertainties arising from labor-related supply network disruption (Wagner and Bode 2008). 
But this potential risk management function of IFAs passes unmentioned in texts of the 
respective agreements as well as in the interviews with managers and, even more surprisingly, 
union representatives involved in negotiating and implementing IFAs. One of the main 
reasons for this may be because TNCs, as lead firms of global supply networks, have been 
able to choose institutional environments where the supply of labor is plentiful and quality 
acceptable, in particular at the periphery of their networks. This has meant that labor-related 
problems have so far, despite the examples given in the introduction of this paper, not been 
significant compared to other issues like the disruption of energy supply or logistic systems. 
This situation, however might change: 
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Proposition 1: IFAs are likely to address labor-related risks and uncertainties in global 
supply networks when the supply of appropriately qualified labor ceases to 
exceed demand and as a result workers begin to express dissatisfaction with 
extant contractual terms and conditions.  
Two other possible proximate causes of a neglect of IFAs as a risk and uncertainty tool are 
first, a low degree of general “risk reflexivity” by management (Power 2007) in organizing 
and managing global supply networks with regard to these issues, particularly because of the 
strict division of respective responsibilities between purchasing departments, CSR/HR 
managers and “uncertainty experts” (Arena et al. 2010) such as internal auditors, management 
accountants or risk specialists in other functional areas. A recent inquiry into supervisory 
boards of leading German firms in the automotive and machine-building industry in the 
aftermath of the Tsunami/Fukushima catastrophe seems to confirm this view (Müller-Seitz 
and Sydow 2012). Second, because of this orientation management tends to rely ultimately on 
terminating supply contracts as a mechanism for dealing with labor-related problems in the 
supply network. In this way labor-related risks are traded for additional “selection 
uncertainty” (Mitsuhashi 2002). These considerations lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: In lieu of IFAs as a relational or commitment-oriented approach for dealing 
with labor-related risks and uncertainties in global supply networks, 
management continues to rely on market rather than relational control 
(through IFAs), trading labor-related risks for additional selection 
uncertainty. 
Although a market-based approach that includes terminating or renegotiating supply contracts 
under competitive conditions to deal with labor-related problems has thus far been sufficiently 
successful to avoid serious practical challenges, the weakness of this system will be revealed 
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where labor is able to exert some bargaining strength either through unions or by high labor 
turnover. Under these conditions the probability of a labor-related network disruption will be 
higher than where an IFA is able to facilitate worker representation, collective bargaining, 
monitoring of labor conditions, and/or conflict resolution in order to ensure stable labor 
relations for an agreed period. Hence the following propositions:   
Proposition 3a: Where a stronger labor market facilitates workers’ improved bargaining 
power, IFAs will be re-negotiated or re-interpreted to assist in adjusting 
employment contracts to the emerging circumstances; and  
Proposition 3b: IFAs will be more frequently used as instruments to limit labor-related risks 
and uncertainties and to address problems arising from such disruption.  
On an even more optimistic note, we would like to conclude with some observations 
concerning how IFAs could act as an important tool in building a high commitment approach 
to labor in contrast to the traditional compliance-based model (Locke et al. 2009). These 
advantages include the following, particularly where unions have developed adequate training 
facilities to ensure representational and administrative effectiveness:  
 working with unions enables (inter-) organizational change and attendant risks and even 
uncertainties to be handled more effectively as there is a partner to represent the often 
divergent interests involved;  
 unions at the supra-national and national levels may provide useful information on 
impending or actual changes in global, regional and national institutional environments 
enabling management within the supply network to better plan and adjust their strategies; 
 at the local level unions may act to effectively monitor agreements on employee pay, 
conditions, productivity and well-being whilst promoting employee skill development in 
order to ensure that the workforce within the supply network is both protected and 
efficient. This will depend on co-ordination by unions which can be assisted by 
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management providing reasonable facilities for union representatives to contact 
colleagues.  
An IFA-based approach may even foster inter-organizational citizenship behavior (Autry et 
al. 2008) as employees in firms within the network build and maintain inter-firm relationships 
through regular exchange of information, and engagement in joint training and innovation 
projects. This would assist in developing relational forms of governance in supply networks 
which would include labor as a stakeholder (Frenkel 2001; Locke et al. 2009). The relational 
form appears to be growing and deepening (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Rinhart et al. 2004; 
Trkman and McCormack 2009) and in time may come to replace market-based or 
transactional approaches as the prime means of reducing supply chain risks and addressing 
consequential problems. Towards this end, research on SCRM nowadays recognizes the 
importance of information-sharing within the supply network for managing demand 
uncertainties (e.g., Ryu et al. 2009; Datta and Christopher 2011). And more generally, it 
emphasizes cooperative approaches that foster engagement, loyalty and learning from other 
members of the supply network (e.g., Ritchie and Brindley 2007; Manuj and Mentzer 2008b; 
Nyaga and Whipple 2011). In sum, the ground has been prepared for a more relational 
approach that would include labor through IFA or similar mechanisms.  
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